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between Two Games of Strategic
Interaction with Computerized
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Michael G. Collins 1, 2*, Ion Juvina 2 and Kevin A. Gluck 1
1 Air Force Research Laboratory, Dayton, OH, USA, 2 Adaptive Strategic Thinking and Executive Control of Cognition and
Affect, Department of Psychology, Wright State University, Dayton, OH, USA
When playing games of strategic interaction, such as iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and
iterated Chicken Game, people exhibit specific within-game learning (e.g., learning
a game’s optimal outcome) as well as transfer of learning between games (e.g., a
game’s optimal outcome occurring at a higher proportion when played after another
game). The reciprocal trust players develop during the first game is thought to mediate
transfer of learning effects. Recently, a computational cognitive model using a novel trust
mechanism has been shown to account for human behavior in both games, including
the transfer between games. We present the results of a study in which we evaluate the
model’s a priori predictions of human learning and transfer in 16 different conditions. The
model’s predictive validity is compared against five model variants that lacked a trust
mechanism. The results suggest that a trust mechanism is necessary to explain human
behavior across multiple conditions, even when a human plays against a non-human
agent. The addition of a trust mechanism to the other learning mechanisms within the
cognitive architecture, such as sequence learning, instance-based learning, and utility
learning, leads to better prediction of the empirical data. It is argued that computational
cognitive modeling is a useful tool for studying trust development, calibration, and repair.
Keywords: cognitivemodeling, a priorimodel prediction, strategic interaction, trust dynamics, transfer of learning,
trust, social dilemma
INTRODUCTION
Social situations such as business negotiations and conflict resolutions are characterized by a strong
interdependence between all parties involved. It has been proposed that people use trust to inform
their decisions within these complex and changing environments and a large body of empirical
research has been devoted to the topic (e.g., Berg et al., 1995; Mayer et al., 1995; Yamagishi et al.,
2005). Trust has been identified as associated with, yet distinct from, other concepts such as
cooperation and risk taking (Kee and Knox, 1970). Trust may involve elements of risk taking in the
form of “willingness to be vulnerable” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 712), and trust may lead to cooperation,
yet both the former and the latter can exist in the absence of trust. Yamagishi et al. (2005) had
participants play a modified version of the game Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and observed
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that cooperation between players emerged at the beginning of an
interaction when trust was low and increased as trust developed
between participants. Participants were also observed taking
small, calculated risks, increasing their trust accordingly, before
larger risks were taken. These findings corroborate the claim
made by Mayer et al. that trust is distinct from, albeit related to,
cooperation and risk taking.
An important distinction in the literature on trust is that
between dispositional trust (also referred to as trust propensity)
and situational trust (also referred to as learned trust). Berg et al.
(1995) found that trust informs the decisions of individuals at
the beginning of an interaction. Even with no prior information
and no interaction with the other person, participants would
trust another player with the expectation that their trust will be
reciprocated. Individual differences in one’s general willingness to
trust another person (i.e., trust propensity) have been identified,
finding that some are more willing to trust another without any
prior experience (i.e., high trustors) than others (i.e., low trustors)
and that these differences lead people to make different choices
when beginning to interact with others (Yamagishi et al., 1999).
Situational trust emerges from interaction and consolidates
through repeated interaction.When participants played the game
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and were randomly reassigned to a
new partner after every round, their trust for the other player
was lower compared to when participants were paired with a
single partner with whom they played repeatedly, in which case
trust increased over time (Yamagishi et al., 2005). Repeatedly
interacting with the same person gives an individual the ability
to calibrate their trust based on their previous experience with
that person. However, the effect of positive and negative events
on an individual’s trust depends on when the event occurs. Lount
et al. (2008) found that negative events that occurred at the
beginning of an interaction decreased one’s trust in another more
so than negative events that occurred later in an interaction. This
suggests that an individual’s trust is more susceptible to change
at the beginning of an interaction when there is little previous
experience on which to base one’s trust compared to later in the
interaction when more experience has been accumulated.
Trust is commonly defined as “the willingness of a party
to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on
the expectation that the other will perform a particular action
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or
control the other party ” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 712). Although
this definition is widely cited, some of its implications are
underrepresented in the current theoretical and empirical work
on trust. A large amount of effort is dedicated to studying
how trust is shaped by the trustor’s propensity to trust and
the trustee’s trustworthiness. We consider that the existing
literature addresses mainly the reactive component of trust (as
derived from the trustor’s propensity to trust and the trustee’s
trustworthiness) and propose here that the proactive component
of trust (i.e., the trust that the trustee will become trustworthy) is
important as well, particularly in understanding trust calibration
and trust repair. We believe that the proactive facet of trust is
captured in the following elements of the definition presented
above (Mayer et al., 1995): “willingness of a party,” “important
to the trustor,” and “irrespective of the ability to monitor or
control the other party.” One can imagine a situation in which
a trustor who has low trust propensity must interact with
someone who has shown low trustworthiness. A reactive trust
model would predict no trust or even distrust in this situation.
However, a proactive trust model would predict at least an
attempt to establish trust, based on the assumption that the
trustee’s trustworthiness may change in the future. We propose
here that a trust model that includes both reactive and proactive
elements is a more accurate depiction of trust dynamics.
In addition, there is a need to understand how different
factors, which have been found to affect trust, interact with each
other to explain the choices made by individuals over time. One
approach to gain such insight is to use computational cognitive
models of how trust is used in specific situations. Developing
models within a cognitive architecture such as ACT-R (Adaptive-
Control of Thought—Rational; Anderson, 2007), Soar (Laird,
2012), or EPIC (Kieras and Meyer, 1997) allows for a formalized
theory of trust to be implemented using general cognitive
mechanisms. Cognitive models also have the ability to be run
in the same experiments as participants, allowing for direct
comparison of human and model data. This approach supports
the development and evaluation of substantive, mechanistic
cognitive theory.
Recently, a computational cognitive model using a novel trust
mechanism has been shown to account for human behavior
in both iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and iterated Chicken
Game (CG), including the transfer of learning between the two
games (Juvina et al., 2015). Here, we examine the predictive
validity of this model. We present the results of a study in
which the model’s a priori predictions of behavior in 16 different
conditions are compared to the behavior of human participants.
To anticipate, the results show that a trust mechanism is
necessary to explain human behavior across multiple conditions,
even when a human plays with a non-human agent.
Games
Games of strategic interaction are often used to study how
people behave in different situations. A game represents an
abstraction of a real world scenario, where the outcomes that
occur are determined by the choices made by all of the players.
One of the simplest types of games of strategic interaction are
2 × 2 games, which consists of two players choosing to either
cooperate or defect (B and A) leading to one of four possible
outcomes after both players make a choice. The payoffs for each
player associated with each outcome within a game vary, in
turn affecting the behavior of both players. Two commonly used
games in both psychological and economic research are iterated
Prisoners Dilemma (PD) and iterated Chicken Game (CG). In
PD, if both players choose to cooperate (B) (mutual cooperation),
each earns one point. If both players choose to defect (A), then
each loses one point. If one player chooses to defect (A) and the
other chooses to cooperate (B), the player who chose to defect
(A) earns four points, while the other player loses four points
(Figure 1). When PD is played repeatedly and each player does
not know when the game will end, the optimal strategy is for both
players to choose to repeatedly cooperate (B), earning one point
during each round.
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FIGURE 1 | The payoff matrix for the game Prisoner’s Dilemma shows
the two players (P1 and P2), the two possible choices they can make
during each round (A or B) and the four possible outcomes that can
occur during a single round (P1’s payoff located in lower left hand
corner, P2’s payoff in upper right hand corner) depending on the
choices made by both players in that round.
FIGURE 2 | The payoff matrix for the game Chicken shows the two
players (P1 and P2), the two possible choices they can make during
each round (A or B) and the four possible outcomes that can occur
during a single round (P1’s payoff is located in lower left hand corner
and P2’s payoff is located in upper right hand corner) depending on the
choices made by both players in that round.
In CG, both players again have the option to either defect or
cooperate (A or B; Figure 2). If both players choose to cooperate
(B), then each player earns one point, as in PD. If both players
choose to defect (A), then both lose four points. If one player
chooses to defect (A) and the other player chooses to cooperate
(B), the player who chose to cooperate (B) loses one point and
the player who chose to defect (A) earns four points. When CG
is played repeatedly and both players do not know when the
game will end, the optimal outcome is for players to repeatedly
asymmetrically alternate between choosing to cooperate and
defect (B and A), to earn 1.5 points each during each
round.
Although the payoffs associated with each choice in PD and
CG are different, certain similarities exist between the two games.
The first is a surface similarity, represented by a similarity in
the payoff matrix of each game, which is that during both PD
and CG players can both choose B and each earn one point.
The second is a deep similarity, not represented on the payoff
matrix but in abstract meaning. The deep similarity between PD
and CG is that the optimal outcome in each game (i.e., repeated
mutual cooperation in PD and asymmetric alternation in CG)
requires players to mutually cooperate and coordinate their
behavior.
TABLE 1 | Choices that the Tit-For-Tat (T4T) strategy would make on round
N during both Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and Chicken Game (CG) based on
the previous choice (round N – 1) of both the strategy and other player.
Tit-For-Tat’s strategic choices
Game Round N – 1 Round N
T4T’s choice Other player’s
choice
T4T’s payoff T4T’s choice
PD A A −1 A
PD A B 4 B
PD B A −4 A
PD B B 1 B
CG A A −4 A
CG A B 4 B
CG B A −1 A
CG B B 1 B
Confederate Agents
In the research that led to the development of the trust model
(Juvina et al., 2013, 2015), human participants played games
in pairs with one another. In the study reported here, human
participants were paired with preprogrammed agents, rather than
with other humans. The agents used a deterministic strategy with
intermittent random choices during a game. The main reason for
using preprogrammed agents is that it allows us to manipulate
trustworthiness and expand the range of conditions in which the
model is tested. Two deterministic strategies that have been used
in prior research are the Tit-for-Tat strategy (T4T; Axelrod, 1984)
and the Pavlov-Tit-for-Tat (PT4T; introduced in Juvina et al.,
2012). T4T repeats on round N the other player’s previous choice
from round N – 1 (Table 1). The PT4T strategy is a combination
of two strategies, T4T and Pavlov (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993).
Pavlov is another deterministic strategy that operates under
the rule of win-stay-lose-shift, only switching choices at round
N if it lost points with its previous choice at round N – 1
(Table 2). Although both the T4T and Pavlov strategy have
shown to be competitive strategies during repeated computer
simulations (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993), Juvina et al. (2012)
found that the repetition propensities (i.e., the probability that
an individual will repeat the same choice following a particular
outcome) of the T4T or Pavlov strategy did not match the
repetition propensity of humans during PD. When playing PD,
humans were found to be less likely to switch choices after an
outcome in which they earned points while the other player lost
points, unlike the T4T strategy which immediately changes its
choice on the next round. To create a strategy that had a more
human like repetition propensity, the win-stay component of
Pavlov was combined with the T4T strategy to make the PT4T
strategy (Table 3). PT4T reciprocates the other player’s choice
after mutual cooperation and mutual defection and switches
choices after unilateral cooperation (i.e., the strategy chose B and
the other player chose A). After instances of unilateral defection
(i.e., the strategy chose A and the other player chose B), the
PT4T strategy will again choose to defect (i.e., win-stay; see
Tables 1, 2).
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TABLE 2 | Choices that the Pavlov strategy would make on round N during
both Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and Chicken Game (CG) based on the
previous choice (round N – 1) of both the strategy and the other player.
Pavlov’s strategic choices
Game Round N – 1 Round N
Pavlov’s choice Other player’s
choice
Pavlov’s payoff Pavlov’s
choice
PD A A −1 B
PD A B 4 A
PD B A −4 A
PD B B 1 B
CG A A −4 B
CG A B 4 A
CG B A −1 A
CG B B 1 B
Transfer of Learning
A game represents a single situation in which individuals interact,
but in the real world people might mix with a single person
across a variety of situations, using what they have learned
about the behavior of another in one context to inform their
decisions in a new situation. For this reason it is often of
interest to examine how individuals behave when interacting
across different games.When PD and CG are played sequentially,
specific transfer of learning effects occur, such that the outcomes
during the first game affect the outcomes during the second
game (Juvina et al., 2013). For example, a higher proportion
of asymmetric alternation is observed during CG when played
after PD and a higher proportion of mutual cooperation is
seen during PD when played after CG. Previous explanations
for these transfer effects, such as a similarity between the
games, the expectation the other player will behave as they
did in the past, or a strategy used during a simpler game
continuing to be used in a more complex game, were unable
to account for all of the transfer effects that were seen when
PD and CG were played in either order (Knez and Camerer,
2000; Devetag, 2005; Bednar et al., 2012). To account for
the transfer of learning effects observed between PD and CG,
Juvina et al. (2013) proposed that deep transfer effects are
mediated by the reciprocal trust between players during games
of strategic interaction. This explanation of transfer effects has
since been implemented as an ACT-R model (details later in
the paper). The model accounts for human behavior without
using a predetermined strategy, but instead using several general
learning mechanisms and a novel trust mechanism which
influences its choices over the course of both games (Juvina et al.,
2015).
Experiment
This experiment is intended to test the extent to which the
model from Juvina et al. (2015) can generalize to a different
sample of participants playing with computer agents who used
preprogrammed strategies. We went beyond model fitting and
adopted the challenging practice of using an existing model to
TABLE 3 | Choices that the Pavlov-Tit-For-Tat (PT4T) strategy would make
on round N during both Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and Chicken Game (CG)
based on the previous choice (round N – 1) of both the strategy and other
player.
Pavlov–Tit-For-Tat’s strategic choices
Game Round N – 1 Round N
PT4T’s choice Other player’s
choice
PT4T’s payoff PT4T’s choice
PD A A −1 A
PD A B 4 A
PD B A −4 A
PD B B 1 B
CG A A −4 A
CG A B 4 A
CG B A −1 A
CG B B 1 B
predict the behavior of participants in a new experiment to
assess the model’s predictive validity. The model from Juvina
et al. (2015) was used to generate a priori predictions of the
behavior of participants when playing the games PD and CG in
varying orders with a confederate agent who used either the T4T
or PT4T strategy and whose trustworthiness was manipulated.
Several changes were introduced into the experimental design
from Juvina et al. (2013), such as a decrease in the number
of rounds per game, different payoff matrices, performance-
based incentives, two new game orders, and the specific strategy
that participants played with, challenging the model’s ability to
account for human behavior under these new conditions. In
addition, we introduced a manipulation check to verify that
each participant’s trust was sensitive to the manipulation of the
confederate agent’s trustworthiness. Two trust questionnaires
were used as a manipulation check: trait trust, also referred
to as trust propensity, is a measure of an individual’s general
dispositional trust toward others; state trust, also referred to as
learned trust or situational trust, refers to the specific trust that
an individual has for a particular person in a particular situation,
in this case the participant’s trust in the confederate agent.
All of the model’s predictions were made publically available
in April of 2015 on http://psych-scholar.wright.edu/ijuvina/
publications. The predictions were then published in the
proceedings of the 10th annual conference on Behavioral
Representation inModeling and Simulation (Collins et al., 2015).
In this paper, the model’s predictions are compared to the
behavior of human participants. The model’s predictions across
all conditions are also compared to five alternative variants, of
the model which did not use a trust-mechanism to account for
the behavior of participants.
Hypotheses
The goal of this experiment was to examine the predictive validity
of an existing model, thus the a priori predictions generated by
this model across all conditions serve as hypotheses. In addition,
three specific hypotheses about the participants’ self-reported
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trust and the model’s trust mechanism were made. First, because
the participant’s reported trait trust (i.e., trust propensity) is a
generalized disposition toward trusting others, we predict that
(1a) participants’ trait trust will not change over the course
of the experiment and (1b) will not significantly predict the
participants’ behavior during the experiment. Second, because a
participant’s reported state trust is specific to the other player, we
predict that (2a) the participants’ state trust will be sensitive to
the strategy and trustworthiness of the confederate agent and (2b)
their state trust after the first game will be a significant predictor
of their behavior during the second game. Third, based on the
model predictions, we hypothesize that (3a) no deep transfer
effects between games will occur in any of the conditions, (3b) the
model will account for the behavior of human participants better
than any of the other model variants, and (3c) each component
of the model’s trust mechanism will be required to account for
human behavior.
METHODS
Participants
For this study, 320 participants (176 male, 144 female; Mage =
36.62, SDage = 10.67) were recruited from the website Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT). AMT is an online labor market where
individuals (workers) complete brief tasks, human intelligence
tasks (HIT) as they are referred to on AMT, in exchange for a
predetermined amount of money. To be eligible to participate
in the experiment, workers had to have completed a minimum
10,000 other HITs and have an approval rating of 95% or
higher. The reason we required a minimum number of HITs by
workers was to ensure data quality. Peer et al. (2014) found that
workers with high experience (i.e., those who completed more
HITS) followed instructions and replicated known effects better
than workers who had completed fewer HITS. All participants
received a base pay of $1 for completing the study and had
the opportunity to earn up to $2 extra dollars based on the
cumulative number of points they earned during both games.
Design
Each participant played two games of strategic interaction (i.e.,
PD Figure 1 and CG Figure 2) for 50 rounds each, playing
either game once (PDCG or CGPD order) or one game twice
(PDPD or CGCG order). Participants played with a confederate
agent whose strategy and trustworthiness were manipulated
throughout and held constant over the course of both games
(Table 4). Each participant was told that the confederate agent
was another individual recruited from AMT, with whom they
would play throughout both games. The participants were
debriefed afterwards about the identity of the confederate
agent. The study was approved by the Write State University’s
Institutional Review Board.
Confederate Agent
The confederate agent utilized one of two predetermined
strategies, T4T or PT4T. The T4T strategy chose on round
N the same choice that the other player made on round
TABLE 4 | The 16 conditions to which participants were randomly
assigned during the experiment.
Experimental conditions
Condition Game order Confederate agent
Game 1 Game 2 Strategy Trustworthiness
1 PD PD T4T HT
2 PD CG T4T HT
3 CG PD T4T HT
4 CG CG T4T HT
5 PD PD PT4T HT
6 PD CG PT4T HT
7 CG PD PT4T HT
8 CG CG PT4T HT
9 PD PD T4T LT
10 PD CG T4T LT
11 CG PD T4T LT
12 CG CG T4T LT
13 PD PD PT4T LT
14 PD CG PT4T LT
15 CG PD PT4T LT
16 CG CG PT4T LT
They played a combination of two games, Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), and Chicken Game
(CG), or the same game twice. During each condition participants played games with
a confederate agent who used either the Tit-for-Tat (T4T) or Pavlov-Tit-for-Tat (PT4T)
strategy and was either high (HT) or low (LT) in trustworthiness.
N – 1 (Table 1). The PT4T strategy reciprocated mutual
cooperation, mutual defection, and unilateral defection (as T4T),
but did not reciprocate unilateral cooperation (as Pavlov; see
Table 2). Along with using one of two predetermined strategies,
the confederate agent’s trustworthiness was manipulated. In
addition, randomness was added into the agents’ behavior to
make it less deterministic and to mimic human-like behavior.
To manipulate trustworthiness, the confederate agent either
randomly cooperated or randomly defected a certain number of
times over the course of each game. In the high trustworthiness
(HT) condition the confederate agent randomly cooperated
and in the low trustworthiness (LT) condition the confederate
agent randomly defected. The number of times that the
confederate agent randomly cooperated or randomly defected
was determined in advance.Multiple simulations were run before
the experiment varying the frequency the confederate agent
cooperation or defection and examining the models’ predictions.
Because PT4T is inherently less trustworthy than T4T (i.e., more
apt to exploit the other player’s attempts to establish mutual
cooperation), to avoid the model predicting a high proportion
of mutual defection during both the PT4T HT and the PT4T
LT conditions, a larger percentage of cooperation was needed
to significantly raise PT4T’s trustworthiness, as determined by
the model simulations. Thus, during the T4T conditions, the
confederate agent would employ the T4T strategy during 90%
(total of 45 rounds) of the game, while randomly cooperating (in
the HT conditions) or defecting (in the LT conditions) on 10%
(total of five rounds) of the rounds. During the PT4T conditions,
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the confederate agent employed the PT4T strategy during 65%
(total of 33 rounds) of the game and randomly cooperated (in
the HT condition) or defected (in the LT condition) during 35%
(total of 17 rounds) rounds of the game.
Materials and Measurements
All participants took surveys tomeasure their trait and state trust.
Trait Trust
The trait trust questionnaire was a 24-item questionnaire
(Appendix A in Supplementary Material) rated on a five-point
Likert scale (1: lowest–5: highest) and was used to measure
a participant’s general willingness to trust others (Colquitt
et al., 2007). It was administered before the first game and
after the second game. The trait trust survey was composed
of a combination of questions from Rotter (1967), Yamagishi
(1986) trust propensity surveys and several items created by the
experimenters.
State Trust
The state trust questionnaire was a 14-item questionnaire
(Appendix B in Supplementary Material) rated on a five-point
Likert scale (1: lowest–5: highest) and was used to measure
the participant’s specific trust in the confederate agent over
the course of the game. It was administered before and after
each game. The items used in the state trust questionnaire
examined the willingness of the participant to allow the other
player to influence the game outcomes and the participant’s
expectations about the other player and their behavior. The state
trust questionnaire was conceived by the experimenters to be
congruent with the definition of trust proposed in Mayer et al.
(1995).
The Model
Here was present an overview of the model used to generate
predictions of participants’ behavior across the different
conditions. A more detailed description of the model and how
it is implemented in the ACT-R architecture can be found in
Juvina et al. (2015). ACT-R is a cognitive architecture and a
formal theory of human cognition (Anderson, 2007), in which
cognition occurs through the interaction of multiple modules,
such as the declarative (know-what) and procedural (know-how)
memory modules. The declarative memory module stores
information that the model has learned from the environment.
The procedural memory allows for action selection reinforced
through reward patterns that occur within the environment
(Anderson, 2007). To account for the behavior of individuals
within and between PD and CG, the model uses a novel trust
mechanism in addition to the traditional mechanisms of the
architecture.
In order for the model to be able to learn to play either game, it
needs to be aware of the interdependence between itself and the
other player; to do this the model uses instance-based learning
(IBL; Gonzalez et al., 2003). In IBL, past instances of an event
are stored in a model’s declarative memory to be recalled later
to inform its future decisions. During each round, the model
stores in its declarative memory the previous choice of both itself
and the other player along with the other player’s choice for the
current round. Throughout both games, each time the model
stores a copy of a previous instance that has already been placed
in its declarative memory it increases the probability that specific
instance will be recalled when placed in a similar situation again,
as controlled by ACT-R’s activation equations (Anderson, 2007).
To account for the behavior of participants without relying on
using a predetermined strategy, the model uses IBL, sequence
learning, and reinforcement learning, to learn how to play
either game. During each round, the model attempts to recall a
previous instance frommemory using both its own and the other
player’s previous choices as retrieval cues. The previous instances
stored in the model’s declarative memory allow it to implement
sequence learning, recalling what the other player’s next choice
was when placed in that situation before. Themodel then predicts
that the other player will choose the move that was chosen most
frequently when placed in a similar situation in the past. Next,
the model chooses to cooperate or defect depending on which
choice has the greatest utility given the model’s prediction of the
other player’s choice. Previous rewards the model has received
for cooperating and defecting in similar contexts (i.e., the other
player’s expected next choice based on the previous choice of the
other player and the model) determine the utility or the value of
these choices to the model (Juvina et al., 2015).
Using a combination of IBL, sequence learning, and
reinforcement learning allows the model to learn how to play
either game with another opponent, but these mechanisms alone
cannot account for the deep transfer effects seen when the games
are played sequentially. In order to account for the deep transfer
effects, a novel trust mechanism consisting of two accumulators
and three different reward functions was added to the model.
The two accumulators are called trust and trust-invest. Each
accumulator starts at zero at the start of the first game and
increases or decreases depending on the choices made by both
the model and the other player after each round. The trust
accumulator is used to track the trustworthiness of the other
player; it increases after outcomes of mutual cooperation and
unilateral defection (i.e., instances where the other player has
shown to be trustworthy) and decreases after outcomes of mutual
defection and unilateral cooperation (i.e., instances where the
other player has shown to be untrustworthy). The trust-invest
accumulator is used to track trust necessity, that is, the need to
establish trust with the other player (e.g., in cases where both
players are continually defecting), it increases after instances
of mutual defection and decreases after instances of unilateral
cooperation. Throughout the game, the current level of the trust
and trust-invest accumulators determines the current reward
function used to reinforce themodel’s choices. This is a principled
way of changing the model’s behavior over the course of the game
based on interaction with the other player.
The three different reward functions used by the model
each reward the model differently for each of the four possible
outcomes that can occur during a game, causing the model to
learn different strategies. When the trust accumulator is positive,
regardless of the level of the trust-invest accumulator, the model
is reinforced for increasing the payoff of both players minus
the other player’s previous payoff. When only the trust-invest
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accumulator is positive, the model is reinforced for increasing
the payoff of the other player, signaling the desire to establish a
trust relationship with the other player. When both accumulators
are at or below zero (i.e., when trust has not been established
or has been lost and the repair attempts have failed), the model
is reinforced for maximizing its own payoff and minimizing the
payoff of the other player. By switching between three different
reward functions, the value the model places on different choices
changes depending on the previous interaction between the
model and the other player, in turn affecting whether the model
learns to maximize the payoff of both players, only the other
player’s payoff, or only its own payoff.
Model Predictions
All of the model’s predictions were generated by placing the
model in each of the 16 experimental conditions and running it
50 times, playing each game with one of 10 versions, mimicking
the procedure that participants followed. To ensure pseudo-
random variability of the confederate agent across participants
and model, 10 different versions of each combination of the
confederate agent’s strategy and trustworthiness were created1.
Once assigned to a condition the model was randomly assigned
to play each game with one of the 10 possible versions of the
confederate agent, as were the participants. A discussion of the
model’s predictions can be found in Collins et al. (2015). The only
part of the experimental procedure that was not copied by the
model was the time between the two games, in which participants
took the state trust survey and received instructions for the next
game.
Procedure
Once recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, participants
were instructed to go to a website where the experiment was
located. On that website, participants first gave their informed
consent, then completed a demographic questionnaire and the
trait trust survey to measure their trust propensity. They were
randomly assigned to one of the 16 experimental conditions and
then they were randomly assigned to play one of the 10 possible
versions of each game in each condition.
Before playing each game, participants received instructions
presented in two parts. The first part of the instructions explained
the game’s payoff matrix. The second part explained how the
payoff matrix could be used to make decisions during the game.
The instructions stated that the games would be played repeatedly
and that points earned during a round depended on the choices
made by both players. After reading the game’s instructions,
participants were required to answer five questions about the
game to verify that they understood the instructions. The five
questions asked, given the choices made by two hypothetical
players, what would the payoff of one of those players be (e.g., If
Player 1 chose A and Player 2 chose B, what is Player 1’s payoff for
that round?). If a participant answered fewer than four of the five
questions correctly, they had to reread the instructions until they
were able to answer at least four out of five questions correctly.
1Qualtrics.com. the implementation platform used for this study, did not support
random event permutations and so a pseudo-random variability design was
implemented.
Once the instructions were completed, participants were
notified that they would play the game with another worker
who was also recruited from AMT and then went on to play
50 rounds of the first game with the confederate agent. After
the first game, participants completed the state trust survey, read
the instructions for the second game, and then went on to play
another 50 rounds of the second game with the same confederate
agent as in the first game. Finally, participants took the state and
trait questionnaires again, were debriefed to the true nature of the
confederate agent, and received payment for their participation.
RESULTS
Manipulation Check
Before the behavior of participants was compared to the model’s
predictions, we first examined the participants’ trait and state
trust scores to ensure that the experimental manipulations did
affect their trust during the experiment. We hypothesized that
the experiment would not affect the participants’ trait trust,
because trait trust is a general disposition to trust others, that
is, it would not be specific to the confederate agent and would
not be a significant predictor of the participant’s behavior. Trait
trust was computed by taking the average of the ratings of the
trait trust questionnaire’s items. The trait trust questionnaire was
administered both before and after the experiment.
To examine whether participants’ reported trait trust changed
over the course of the experiment, a paired t-test was run on
trait trust scores before and after the study. The trait trust
score before (M = 3.23, SD = 0.57) and after (M = 3.20,
SD = 0.61) the experiment were found to be statistically different
[t(313) = 2.08, p < 0.05], decreasing slightly after playing
the games (Figure 3). To test if the change in trait trust was
affected differently by the confederate agent strategies and levels
of trustworthiness, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run
on the difference score (dif ) of the reported trait trust (i.e.,
the trait trust before the experiment subtracted from the trait
trust after the experiment) as a dependent variable with the
strategy and trustworthiness of the confederate agent as factors.
The ANOVA found no significant main effect of the confederate
agent’s strategy (p > 0.05), but a significant main effect of
the confederate agent’s trustworthiness was found [F(1, 310) =
6.88, p < 0.05]. The participants’ trait trust score decreased
after playing with a low trustworthiness agent (Mdif = 0.07,
SDdif = 0.33) and increased slightly after playing with a high
trustworthiness agent (Mdif = − 0.007, SDdif = 0.22).
Finally, to observe if the participants’ reported trait trust
predicted their behavior during the experiment, a linear
regression was run using a participant’s trait trust before the
experiment to predict the overall frequency they cooperated in
the experiment. The participants’ reported trait trust before the
experiment was found not to be a significant predictor of their
overall frequency of cooperation during the experiment (p >
0.05).
With regard to state trust, it was predicted that participants
would be sensitive to the trustworthiness and strategy of the
confederate agent, thus their trust in the other player would vary
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FIGURE 3 | Trait trust measured before and after the experiment; the
error bars represent standard error of the mean.
across conditions. Based on the model’s predictions, we expected
that the participants would have less trust in the confederate
agents that used the PT4T strategy and had low trustworthiness.
Both of these two factors (i.e., the PT4T strategy and low
trustworthiness manipulation) make the confederate agent more
likely to unilaterally defect and thus appear less trustworthy. The
state trust of participants was computed as the average of all of
their responses to the state trust survey taken after the first and
second game in each condition, averaging these two scores.
To compare the state trust scores of participants across
different conditions, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) on
the participant’s averaged state trust score was run with the
confederate agent’s strategy and trustworthiness as factors. The
ANOVA revealed significant main effects of strategy [F(1, 316) =
11.49, p < 0.05] and trustworthiness [F(1, 316) = 73.182, p <
0.05]. As expected, participants were found to have more trust
in the confederate agent who used the T4T (M = 3.85, SD =
0.82) strategy than PT4T (M = 3.46, SD = 0.94) strategy and
the agent whose trustworthiness was high (M = 4.02, SD =
0.80) compared to low (M = 3.29, SD = 0.85; Figure 4). This
suggests that the experimental manipulations to the confederate
agent’s strategy and trustworthiness had a significant effect on the
participants’ trust.
Finally, we examined if the participant’s state trust score
after the first game significantly predicted the frequency of
cooperation during the second game. We hypothesized that,
because state trust is specific to the other player, participants with
a higher state trust score in the confederate agent will be more
willing to cooperate during the second game. A linear regression
with the participants’ frequency of cooperation during the second
game as a dependent variable and their state trust score after
the first game as a predictor was run. Although the regression
accounted for only 10% of the variance in the data [R2 = 0.10,
F(1, 318) = 36.76, p < 0.01], the participants’ state trust score after
the first game was found to significantly predict their frequency
of cooperation during the second game (β = 0.05, p < 0.01).
Performance Metrics
When comparing the model’s predictions to the behavior of
human participants across the 16 different conditions, two
performancemetrics during both games were examined. The first
was the proportion of each outcome (i.e., mutual cooperation,
unilateral cooperation, unilateral defection, mutual defection,
and alternation) during each round across 50 model runs
(i.e., simulated participants) and 20 human participants in
each condition. Instances of alternation were determined by
identifying rounds where the participant (or model) and the
confederate agent made opposite choices on round N and had
each made the opposite moves on round N – 1 (for example,
moves A and B on round N, while moves B and A on round
N – 1). The round-by-round proportion of alternation was then
computed like all other outcomes.
The second performance metric was the round-by-round
repetition propensities. The round-by-round repetition
propensity (Rapoport, 1967) was calculated by identifying on
each round the probability that either the model or participant
would repeat the same move after a particular outcome in the
previous round (e.g., the probability that a participants who were
involved in mutual defection outcome on round 5 would choose
to defect again on round 6 is represented as A after AA). The
round-by-round repetition propensity was examined instead of
the overall average repetition propensity of the model or human
participants, because the temporal dynamics of the interaction
are lost when the average repetition propensity is taken. We use
these two metrics to assess the predictive validity of the model’s a
priori predictions.
Predictive Validity
The main purpose of this experiment was to examine the
predictive validity of the model, that is, determine how well a
model that was fit to another dataset generalized to a new sample
of participants and a new set of experimental conditions. The
correlation (r) and the root mean squared deviation between
the round-by-round proportion of all five outcomes in both the
model predictions and human participants were computed, both
over all 16 and each individual condition. The overall proportion
(i.e., mean of the round-by-round proportion) of each outcome
in both the model predictions and human participants were also
used to evaluate the model’s fit.
The overall r and RMSD (r = 0.66, p > 0.001, RMSD = 0.19)
across all of the experimental conditions was lower than the
model’s original fit (r = 0.87, RMSD = 0.09) to data from Juvina
et al. (2013). However, the overall correlation between themodel’s
a priori predictions and the current human data is encouraging
taking into account the fact that the model was fit to a single
other dataset and then used to predict the behavior of individuals
across 16 different conditions. From the r and RMSD between the
model and participants in each condition and the comparison of
the overall proportion of each outcome, three observations
can be made about the model’s predictions (Figure 5;
Table 5).
First, as is seen in the overall proportion of each outcome,
the behavior of the model varied across the experiment, differing
from the behavior of human participants in particular ways
across the 16 conditions. These results show that the behavior
of model and participants was sensitive to both the game
order and the confederate agent. The differences in the overall
proportion also highlight differences in behavior between the
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FIGURE 4 | The mean and standard error of the mean of the participants’ state trust. Participants were found to have more trust in the high (HT) than the low
(LT) trustworthiness agent and the Tit-for-Tat (T4T) than the Pavlov-Tit-For-Tat (PT4T) strategy.
FIGURE 5 | The mean ± one standard deviation of the overall proportion that each of the five outcomes [mutual cooperation (CC), unilateral
cooperation (CD), unilateral defection (DC), mutual defection (DD), and alternation (ALT)] was choosen over the course of both games in each of the
16 conditions, during both the model predictions (star and dashed lines) and human participants (dot and solid lines).
model and participants. Second, conditions with the highest
correlation are all conditions in which the confederate agent
used the PT4T strategy. A higher correlation between model
and human behavior when the confederate agent used the
PT4T strategy would be expected, due to the fact that PT4T
strategy is more apt to defect during a game, leading to less
behavioral variability when the model or participant played with
this strategy compared to the T4T strategy. Third, conditions
with the lowest correlations occurred when the first game played
was CG, suggesting that the model and participants behaved
differently when playing CG. A difference in how the model and
participant played the first game in a condition would have led
to further difference between the model’s predictions and the
participants’ behavior in the second game, due to between game
learning. From these results, it can be concluded that the model’s
predictions could account for a certain degree of the human data
and its ability to do so depended in part on the order games
were played within a condition and the characteristics of the
confederate agent.
Repetition Propensities
Table 5 shows that the majority of conditions where CG was
the first game had the lowest correlations. These results suggest
a difference in how the model and participants played CG,
which would have led the model and human participants to
adopt different strategies during the game. To compare the
behavior of the model and participants, the round-by-round
repetition propensity of the model and participants during CG
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TABLE 5 | Correlation (r) and root mean squared deviation (RMSD) between the model’s predictions and the human behavior in each condition, averaged
across all five outcomes.
Correlation and RMSD between the model’s predictions and the human participants
Condition r RMSD Condition r RMSD
CGCG PT4T HT −0.03 0.18 PDPD T4T HT 0.55 0.23
CGPD PT4T HT −0.03 0.22 PDCG T4T HT 0.66 0.14
CGPD T4T HT −0.01 0.22 PDPD T4T LT 0.67 0.17
CGCG T4T LT 0.22 0.19 PDCG PT4T HT 0.68 0.15
CGPD T4T LT 0.28 0.27 CGCG PT4T LT 0.86 0.17
PDCG T4T LT 0.29 0.25 PDCG PT4T LT 0.88 0.16
CGCG T4T HT 0.48 0.16 CGPD PT4T LT 0.93 0.14
PDPD PT4T HT 0.58 0.19 PDPD PT4T LT 0.96 0.09
FIGURE 6 | The difference of the round-by-round repetition propensities between the model and participants for the four different repetition
propensities during the Chicken Game (CG) in conditions when it was played first in the Tit-for-Tat (T4T) high trustworthiness (HT; solid black line),
T4T low trustworthiness (LT; dashed red line), Pavlov-Tit-for-Tat (PT4T) HT (green line with sold dot), and PT4T LT condition (blue line with closed dot).
All of the round-by-round repetition propensities were smoothed by using the loess function in R (smoothing parameter of 0.2), to remove some of the round-by-round
variability.
when it was played first was calculated across all conditions. A
difference score was then calculated by subtracting the model’s
round-by-round repetition propensity from the participant’s.
Difference scores at zero indicate that the repetition propensity
of the humans and model were the same. A negative difference
score indicates that the model under predicted the repetition
propensity of participants and a positive difference score
indicates that the model over predicted the repetition propensity
of participants.
Examining the differences in repetition propensity in CG2
(Figure 6), it becomes apparent that humans are more likely than
2The difference of the round by round repetition propensities during conditions
that started with PD are not discussed here, but are reported in the Supplementary
Material.
the model to continue to cooperate after mutual cooperation (C
after CC) and unilateral cooperation (C after CD) and continue to
defect after unilateral defection (D after DC); in contrast, humans
are less likely than the model to continue to defect after mutual
defection (D after DD). This suggests that the current sample of
participants may be more sensitive to payoff than the original
sample. Recall that participants in the current study were paid
for performance, whereas the participants in the original study
(Juvina et al., 2013) were not. The payoff sensitivity may be
stronger in CG because mutual defection is much more costly
in CG than in PD. Thus, the poor predictive performance of
the model in conditions that started with CG may be due to
differences in how participants were incentivized in the two
different studies and may not challenge the core assumptions of
the model.
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Transfer Effects
Previous research has found that, when PD and CG were played
sequentially, specific between-game learning effects were seen,
which the model was able to replicate (Juvina et al., 2015).
However, it has yet to be shown if the model can accurately
predict when between game learning effects (transfer effects) will
and will not occur. In this study, deep transfer effects (defined
above and more extensively in Juvina et al., 2013) could have
occurred only in conditions where the confederate agent used the
T4T strategy. Both optimal outcomes (i.e., mutual cooperation
in PD and alternation in CG) can be achieved when playing
with T4T, whereas only mutual cooperation can occur when
playing with PT4T. Alternation cannot be achieved in CG when
playing with PT4T, because PT4T does not reciprocate unilateral
cooperation (i.e., it will continue to defect after a winning
defection—win-stay). Thus, deep transfer effects could not have
occurred in games with PT4T. All transfer effects were assessed
using a paired t-test, run on the round-by-round proportion
of an outcome when PD or CG was played first compared to
the round-by-round proportion of the same outcome and game
when played second game with a confederate agent who used
the same strategy and trustworthiness (e.g., the proportion of the
first 50 rounds of alternation during CG when played before PD,
compared to the 50 rounds of CG played after PD, when playing
with the T4T HT confederate agent). Finding that the proportion
of an outcome occurred significantly higher when the game was
played second indicates transfer of learning.
Deep Transfer: PD to CG
A deep transfer of learning from PD to CG would consist of
alternation occurring at a higher proportion when CGwas played
after PD (as observed in Juvina et al. (2013), in either the HT
or LT T4T conditions. However, in the current study, in which
human participants played games with simple preprogrammed
agents, the model predicted that no deep transfer of learning
from PD to CG would occur. Moreover, the model predicted
that alternation would occur at a slightly lower proportion when
CG is played after PD. Specifically, the model predicted that the
proportion of alternation during CG when played before PD in
the T4T HT (M = 31.5% SD = 10.09%) and LT (M = 9.9%,
SD = 4.18%) conditions would decrease when played after PD,
in both the T4T HT (M = 21.18%, SD = 10.7%) and the T4T
LT (M = 1.7%, SD = 1.5%) conditions. The decrease in the
proportion of alternation was found to be significant in both the
T4T HT [t(48) = 9.05, p < 0.001] and T4T LT [t(48) = 14.41,
p < 0.001] conditions. The lack of deep transfer from PD to
CGwas confirmed by the human data (Figure 7). The proportion
of alternation significantly decreased during CG in the T4T HT
condition from when played first (M = 19%, SD = 12%) to
when played second [M = 15%, SD = 5.06%; t(48) = 2.23, p <
0.03]. A slight decrease was seen in the proportion of alternation
from when CG was played first in the T4T LT condition (M =
16.22%, SD = 7.39) to when it was played second (M = 15.71%,
SD= 7.7%), but this was not found to be significant [t(48) = 0.31,
p > 0.05].
Deep Transfer: CG to PD
A deep transfer of learning from CG to PD would consist of
mutual cooperation occurring at a higher proportion in PDwhen
played after CG compared to when played before CG. The model
predicted that no deep transfer would occur between CG and PD
in either the T4T HT or LT conditions. The proportion of mutual
cooperation was predicted to decrease in the T4T HT condition,
from when PD was played before CG (M = 49%, SD = 17%) to
FIGURE 7 | The round-by-round proportion of alternation during Chicken Game in both the model predictions (dashed lines) and human data (solid
lines), when played before (CGPD order) and after (PDCG order) the game Prisoner’s Dilemma. All of the overall round-by-round proportions were smoothed
by using the loess function in R(smoothing parameter of 0.2), to remove some of the round-by-round variability.
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when PDwas played after CG [M = 41%, SD= 18%; t(49) = 3.94,
p < 0.001]. A decrease in the proportion of mutual cooperation
was also predicted to occur in the T4T LT condition, from when
PD was played before CG (M = 11% SD = 0.05%), to when
PD was played after CG [M = 3%, SD = 2%; t(49) = 9.367,
p < 0.001].
The human data confirm themodel’s prediction of the absence
of deep transfer effects in the T4T HT conditions. A slight
increase in the proportion of mutual cooperation in PD from
when played before CG (M = 34%, SD = 8%) to when played
after CG (M = 35%, SD = 6%) was found not to be significant
[t(49) = −1.3315, p > 0.05]. However, in the T4T LT condition,
a significant difference was found in the proportion of mutual
cooperation in PD fromwhen played before CG (M = 16%, SD=
8%), to when played after CG [M = 30%, SD= 8%; t(49) = −8.7,
p < 0.001; Figure 8]. This is more likely to be a surface and not a
deep transfer effect. When CG was played before PD in the T4T
LT condition, the mutual cooperation outcome was chosen at a
higher proportion than alternation and it might have transferred
directly to PD (Figure 9). If there were a deep transfer effect,
alternation would be expected to occur at a higher proportion
than mutual cooperation in CG. In addition, mutual cooperation
would be expected to increase from CG to PD, which was not
observed.
The percentage of rounds in which mutual cooperation
occurred during each game (CG and PD) in all 20 participants
during the CGPD T4T LT condition was computed. A t-test
revealed that the average proportion of mutual cooperation
during CG (M = 19.60%, SD = 18%) was not significantly
different than during PD [M = 15.45%, SD = 16.83%; t(19) =
1.5713, p > 0.05] (Figure 9). These results suggest that transfer
from CG to PD occurred along the games surface and not deep
similarities. The model failed to predict this surface transfer
effect.
Model Variants
The results presented above show that the human data matches
the model’s predictions to a certain degree. However, it is
unknown how much the model’s novel trust mechanism
improved its ability to predict the participants’ behavior. Juvina
et al. (2015) found that the model’s trust mechanism was
necessary to account for the interaction between pairs of human
participants. However, a human participant in this experiment
interacted with a simple agent, not with another human.
Did this modification render the proposed trust mechanism
irrelevant to the new experimental paradigm? One observation
suggesting that this may be the case is that no deep transfer
effects occurred across the experimental conditions. Here, we
examine this question in detail. The participants’ responses to
the state trust survey showed that their state trust was sensitive
to characteristics of the confederate agent (i.e., strategy and
trustworthiness, see Section Manipulation Check); however, it
is unknown whether the participants used their trust in the
confederate agent to inform their decisions. Due to the fact
that the confederate agent used a simple strategy over the
course of a game, informed only by the players’ previous
moves, perhaps a simpler model could have accounted as
well or better for the behavior of human participants. To
evaluate the necessity of the model’s trust mechanism, we
compared the results of the model’s predictions to five model
variants.
Each of the five model variants used the same learning
mechanisms as the original model (i.e., instance based learning,
sequence learning, and reinforcement learning), but lacked the
trust mechanism, using only a single reward function to learn
its strategy over the course of both games. The reward functions
used in each of the variations of the model were the same used
in Juvina et al. (2015), corresponding to the following reward
functions: the model’s payoff (P1n), the other player’s payoff
FIGURE 8 | The round-by-round proportion of mutual cooperation during Prisoner’s Dilemma in both the model predictions (dashed lines) and human
data (solid lines), when played before (PDCG order: black line) and after (CGPD Order: red line) the Chicken Game. All of the overall round-by-round
proportions were smoothed by using the loess function in R (smoothing parameter of 0.2), to remove some of the round-by-round variability.
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FIGURE 9 | The round-by-round proportion of all five outcomes [i.e., mutual cooperation (CC), unilateral cooperation (CD), unilateral defection (DC),
mutual defection (DD), and alternation (ALT)] of both the model and participants during the CGPD Tit-for-Tat low trustworthiness condition,
highlighting the surface transfer effect from CG to PD with the mutual cooperation outcome (thick black line) in the human data which was absent in
the model’s predictions. All of the overall round-by-round proportions were smoothed by using the loess function in R (smoothing parameter of 0.2), to remove
some of the round-by-round variability.
(P2n), the joint payoff of the model and the other player (P1n +
P2n), the model’s payoff minus the payoff of the other player
(P1n − P2n), and the joint payoff of both players minus the
previous payoff of the other player (P1n + P2n − P2n−1). Each of
the five models was run in the 16 experimental conditions just as
the original model.
We compared the overall r and RMSD between each of the
five model variants and the human data against the a priori
predictions of the original model. In addition, we calculated
the number of individual conditions where a model variant
fit the human data better than the original model (i.e., higher
correlation and lower RMSD). The results show that the
original model (including a trust mechanism) had both the
highest r and the lowest RMSD compared to any other of
the five model variations (Table 6). These results support the
proposal that the trust mechanism is an important addition to
the other learning mechanisms of the cognitive architecture,
giving the model a principled way to change its strategy over
the course of the game, even when playing with a scripted
agent.
Necessity of the Components of the Trust
Mechanism
A comparison of the original model to five model variations
revealed that a model which took into account trust was
better able to account for human behavior than models
TABLE 6 | Correlation (r) and root mean squared deviation (RMSD)
between models and human data for the original model (trust) and five
model variants run in the same 16 conditions as the human participants.
Model r RMSD Number of conditions
Trust 0.66 0.19 NA
P1n 0.50 0.24 4
P1n − P2n 0.46 0.30 1
P1n + P2n − P2n−1 0.32 0.26 2
P1n + P2n 0.31 0.31 0
P2n 0.26 0.35 0
The third column (number of conditions) indicates the number of conditions in which a
model variant fit the data better than the trust model.
which did not. However, this analysis does not reveal if each
component of the model’s trust mechanism (i.e., trust and trust
invest accumulators) is necessary for the original model to
account for the human data. Each of the model’s accumulators
represents a particular facet of trust, the trust accumulator
representing the reactive component of trust and the trust
invest accumulator representing the proactive component of
trust. We propose that both components of the trust mechanism
are necessary to account for human behavior. To examine
the degree to which each component of the trust mechanism
contributed to the model’s predictions, we compared the original
model’s predictions (i.e., including both trust and trust invest
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accumulators), to a reactive model that used only the trust
accumulator. The reactive model was run through all 16
conditions just as the original model, alternating between two
payoff functions, attempting to maximize the joint payoff of both
players minus the payoff of the other player’s previous payoff (P1n
+ P2n − P2n−1), when the trust accumulator was greater than
zero, or maximize its own payoff minus the payoff of the other
player (P1n − P2n), when the trust accumulator was at or below
zero.
The reactive model’s overall correlation was lower and RMSD
higher between outcomes in each of the 16 conditions and human
participants (r = 0.61, RMSD = 0.22), than were the same
measures between the original model and the human participants
(r = 0.66, RMSD = 0.19). A Steiger’s Z-test revealed that
the difference in the correlations was significant (ZH = 13.86,
p < 0.001). Thus, the addition of the trust invest accumulator
significantly improves the model predictions. Additionally, a
visual inspection of the results reveals that the reactive model
generated predictions of behavior that were qualitatively different
than the behavior observed in the human participants during the
PT4T LT conditions.
In the PT4T LT conditions, the confederate agent will
exploit unilateral cooperation by the model or the human
participant. During these conditions the original model predicted
a high proportion of mutual defection, but also predicted that
participants would attempt to occasionally cooperate over the
course of the game, which was also observed in the human data3.
However, this type of behavior was not captured by the reactive
model; instead, it predicted a high proportion ofmutual defection
and fewer attempts to unilaterally cooperate (Figure 10). The
reactive model was limited by the fact that its behavior was
solely reactive to the trustworthiness of the other player; once
the confederate agent was shown to be untrustworthy, it would
attempt to only maximize its own payoff for the remainder of
both games.
3We assume that participants occasionally cooperated over the course of the game
in order to attempt to reestablish mutual cooperation between players. However,
with only the behavioral outcomes we do not know the true motives of the
participants’ choices.
One possible reason for only a small difference being observed
between the a priori predictions of the original and reactive
model was the fact that the confederate agent applied the
same strategy and trustworthiness during both games. Had the
confederate agent exhibited more variability in its behavior
over the course of the games (e.g., changing its strategy or
trustworthiness), we would predict a greater difference in the
predictions between the original and the reactive model, due to
fact that the reactive model would not be as sensitive to changes
in the confederate agent’s behavior. To examine this hypothesis,
we ran the original and reactive models through a simulation of
16 different conditions, similar to the conditions presented in this
experiment with the only difference being that the confederate
agent changed its strategy after the first game (i.e., using the
T4T strategy during the first game and then PT4T during the
second game or vice versa). Although no human data are yet
available to compare the two models’ predictions, based only on
simulations, the original model predicts less mutual defection
than the reactive model across the 16 conditions (Figure 11).
This difference in the predicted proportion of mutual defection
suggests that the reactive model does indeed lack the ability
to detect a change in the confederate agent’s strategy from the
first to the second game, making it less robust than the original
model.
DISCUSSION
In this article, we examined the predictive validity of a
computational cognitive model that was fit post-hoc to the
aggregate behavior of individuals within and between two
different games of strategic interaction, using how individuals are
thought to develop trust in each other to inform their strategies
(Juvina et al., 2015). Fitting a model to a dataset post-hoc leaves
particular questions about the validity of the model unanswered.
Here, we have attempted to test the model’s predictive validity
by addressing the question of whether the model could account
for behavior of another sample of participants, playing under
different conditions, and with specific strategies. We used the
model to generate a priori predictions of human behavior across
FIGURE 10 | Results of the original model predictions (A), human data (B), and reactive model (C) in the Pavlov-Tit-for-Tat Low Trustworthiness
condition when playing Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and then Chicken Game (CG). Each graph shows the round-by-round proportion of each of the five possible
outcomes, mutual cooperation (CC), unilateral cooperation (CD), unilateral defection (DC), mutual defection (DD), and asymmetric alternation (ALT). All of the overall
round-by-round proportions were smoothed by using the loess function in R (smoothing parameter of 0.2), to remove some of the round-by-round variability.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 14 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 49
Collins et al. Trust Dynamics Predicts Human Behavior
FIGURE 11 | The overall round-by-round proportion of mutual
defection in the original trust model (solid blue line) that used both the
trust and trust invest accumulator and the reactive model (dashed blue
line) that used only the trust accumulator during a simulation of 16
different conditions where the confederate agent changed its strategy
after the first game, changing from the Pavlov-Tit-for-Tat (PT4T) to the
Tit-for-Tat (T4T) strategy or from the T4T to the PT4T strategy.
16 different conditions, playing two games in various orders, and
with a confederate agent playing specific strategies and having
different levels of trustworthiness.
The model assumes that trust in the other player develops
based on the dynamics of the interaction between the two
players and, in turn, determines the strategy that the model
adopts at any given time during a game. In line with the
model’s trust assumption, we hypothesized that participants’ self-
reported state trust (also referred to as learned or situational
trust in the literature) would be sensitive to the manipulations
of the confederate agent’s strategy and trustworthiness. In
contrast, we hypothesized that the participants’ self-reported
trait trust (also referred to as dispositional trust or trust
propensity in the literature) would not be sensitive to
the experimental manipulations. The results supported these
hypotheses. Participants reported lower state trust in the
confederate agent who used the PT4T compared to the T4T
strategy and was low compared to high in trustworthiness, along
being a significant predictor of their behavior during the second
game. In contrast, the participants’ reported trait trust was found
to change over the course of the experiment and decrease slightly
during the low trustworthiness conditions, but was not found to
be a significant predictor of their behavior in the first game. The
change reported in the participants’ trait trust over the course of
the experiment suggests that trait trust may change as a function
of experience. Thus, the experimental manipulations were indeed
related to trust and thus the current study provided a relevant test
to a trust model.
The model’s a priori predictions were partially corroborated;
this is encouraging, considering the differences between the
current and previous experimental designs. Each of the games
was shortened from 200 to 50 rounds, which limited the
experience of the participant with the confederate agent and
could have affected the time available to learn the optimal
outcome of a game and the time the participant had to
develop trust in the other player. The participants played with
a confederate agent that used a simple strategy and did not learn
over the course of the game, whereas the model was originally
fit to the aggregate results of pairs of human participants. In
the current study, the participants were paid for performance,
whereas in the original study they were paid a fixed amount.
Any of these differences between the two experiments could have
challenged the model to the point of catastrophic failure. An
example of catastrophic failure for a trust model would be a case
in which the empirical data were more accurately predicted by a
simpler model that did not assume trust. We have compared the
model’s predictive performance to that of five model variants and
showed that the trust mechanism of the original model caused a
significant increase in prediction accuracy.
The trust mechanism allowed the model to switch strategies
based on its experience with a particular player, its predictions
of what the other player might do, and its assessment of the
current game dynamics, something that none of the simpler
model variants considered here had the ability to do4. Although
each of the model variants used the same learning mechanisms as
the trust model (i.e., IBL, sequence learning, and utility learning),
they used the same payoff function throughout the entire game,
which meant they couldn’t change the strategy they learned. This
led to cases in which the simpler models were taken advantage of,
or unable to evade continual mutual defection. The trust model
mitigated these problems by monitoring the trustworthiness of
the other player and the need to build trust with the other
player and switching strategies accordingly. The comparison of
the trust model to the other model variants showed that the trust
mechanism played an important role in accounting for human
behavior over a wide range of conditions.
Additionally, evidence supporting the necessity of both
components of the model’s trust mechanism was found. A
reactive model, using only the trust accumulator was found to
account for human participants better than either of the model
variants, but not as well as the original model that used the
entire trust mechanism. The reactive model was limited by the
fact that its trust in the confederate agent was governed solely by
the trustworthiness of the other player. If the confederate agent
was found untrustworthy, as in the PT4T LT conditions, the
reactive model would begin to play selfishly and had no way to
attempt to reestablish trust later on in the game. In comparison,
human participants under these conditions were observed to
occasionally attempt to cooperate over the course of the game
despite evidence of untrustworthiness of the confederate agent.
This behavior was predicted by the original model because of
its trust invest accumulator, allowing it to better capture human
behavior.
Finding that both of the trust accumulators used by the
original model were necessary to account for human behavior
4We do not claim to have exhausted the full set of simpler models that could
explain the empirical data.
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lends support for the distinction between reactive and proactive
facets of trust. Although the trust propensity and trustworthiness
of another person (i.e., reactive components of trust) may be
informative enough to base one’s trust on in most situations,
situations exist where the trustworthiness of another has been
lost or is proven absent. In order to avoid continual mutually
destructive outcomes, it may be necessary to proactively trust
that the other person will become trustworthy, to rebuild a
trust relationship. Although no large difference between the
original and reactive model was found when explaining the
behavior of human participants in the current experiment, we
would predict a larger difference in the behavior of these two
models under circumstances where the other player changes its
behavior. Results from an unpublished simulation support this
claim: when the confederate agent changed strategies during
the second game, the original model was found to be more
robust because it was able to detect the other player’s change in
strategy.
The authors would like to add a note of caution regarding
interpretation of the results of this study as being characteristic of
human–human interaction during these particular games. Others
have noted differences in behavioral outcomes between humans
playing in pairs with one another and humans playing with
deterministic strategies (Harford and Solomon, 1967; Craig et al.,
2013). Had the participants played in pairs with each other we
would expect more variability in outcomes during the games
and in the responses to the state trust questionnaire. However,
the goal of this study was not to create confederate agents that
mimicked human behavior, but to attempt to predict the response
of participants to specific experimental manipulation (i.e., game
order, strategy, and trustworthiness).
Future Research
The findings presented here suggest two possible future lines of
research. The first is related to the sophistication of the players.
Conceivably, the behavioral outcomes that occur when a human
participant plays games of strategic interaction depend in part
on the ability of the other player. Human participants who
played PD and CG with other human participants exhibited deep
transfer of learning effects (Juvina et al., 2013), whereas these
effects were absent when participants played the same games
with a scripted agent, as shown above. Craig et al. (2013) have
suggested that, although having participants play games with
simple predetermined strategies (e.g., T4T and Pavlov) allows for
more experimental control during games of strategic interaction,
these strategies may give rise to less interesting behavioral effects.
We suggest that future research should examine the behavior
of individuals when playing games of strategic interaction with
more complex models, such as the one presented here.
The second line of future research is to further improve
the ecological validity of the current model, by having it take
into account non-verbal cues or facial expressions. For example,
De Melo et al. (2011) found that when playing PD with a
confederate agent that used the T4T strategy and displayed
particular facial expressions during the game, the frequency
of cooperation depended on the expressions that the agent
displayed after certain outcomes. When given the opportunity,
humans use more information than just previous choices and
payoffs to inform their decision. Adding the ability to take in such
features could improve the external validity of the model and its
possible application to real world scenarios.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, a computational cognitive model incorporating a
trust mechanism was able to generate more accurate predictions
than simpler models that did not assume trust or used only part
of the trust mechanism. The ability of the model to account
for human-human interaction both within and between two
different games, using no predetermined strategy, but instead
learning to play and trust the other player over time was
demonstrated elsewhere (Juvina et al., 2015). Finding that the
same model also accounted for human behavior under a variety
of new conditions suggests that the model incorporates plausible
cognitive mechanisms explaining how humans develop and use
trust in games of strategic interaction.
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